On June 21, 2023, India became the 27th signatory to the Artemis Accords — quietly, without public debate, and without consulting non-governmental stakeholders. Prime Minister Modi was visiting Washington, the cameras were rolling, and India was suddenly part of a US-led space governance framework. But what exactly did India sign? And more importantly, what did it not sign?
These are not rhetorical questions. They are legal questions that India’s space community, policymakers, and emerging private sector must urgently answer.
What Are the Artemis Accords
The Artemis Accords[1] are not a treaty. They are not legally binding. They are a set of bilateral arrangements between the United States government and individual nations, drafted by NASA and the US Department of State, built around principles of transparency, interoperability, peaceful use of space, and most controversially, the right to extract and utilise space resources.
The Accords are explicitly grounded in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty[2]. But here is the tension. The OST says space is the “province of all mankind.” The Artemis Accords, by permitting resource extraction and creating safety zones around operational areas, inch toward something the OST never contemplated: a quasi-territorial claim dressed in the language of sustainability.
What India Actually Signed
India signed the principles. India did not join the Artemis Programme itself, the actual NASA-led mission to return humans to the Moon. ISRO is not a partner agency in any Artemis mission as of today. India has its own lunar roadmap including the Chandrayaan series, Gaganyaan, and the proposed Bharatiya Antariksha Station under Space Vision 2047.
In practical terms, India’s signature is a political signal, an alignment with the US-led space order, not an operational commitment. As a Parliamentary response confirmed, ISRO will only explore the possibilities of participation in the Artemis programme in future.
So, India signed the philosophy, not the mission.
The Legal Problem Nobody Is Discussing
Here is where it gets complicated from a legal standpoint.
The Artemis Accords permit signatories to extract and utilise space resources. India, as a signatory to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, is bound by the principle of non-appropriation, meaning no nation can claim sovereignty over outer space or celestial bodies. The Accords carefully avoid the word “ownership” and instead use “utilisation”, but critics argue this is a distinction without a meaningful legal difference.
Further, India has not signed the Moon Agreement of 1979, which declares lunar resources as the Common Heritage of Mankind, a far more restrictive position. By signing the Artemis Accords, India has implicitly chosen a side in a debate it had not officially taken a position on.
What does this mean for India’s domestic space companies? Startups like Skyroot and Agnikul, and future entities that may pursue lunar or asteroid missions, will now operate under a policy framework that permits resource extraction but without a domestic Space Activities law to actually govern how that extraction works, who owns what is extracted, and how liability is assigned.
India has a Space Policy. It does not have a Space Law. And no Accord, binding or otherwise, can substitute for that.
The Strategic Reality
India’s signing was not purely legal. It was geopolitical. Space is increasingly divided into two blocs: the Artemis camp led by the US, and the International Lunar Research Station project led by China and Russia. India’s signature places it firmly in the former camp, signalling its broader alignment with Western-led multilateral frameworks.
This has consequences. China and Russia have criticised the Artemis Accords as a US attempt to dominate space governance outside the UN framework, specifically outside COPUOS, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, where consensus-based rulemaking happens slowly but with universal legitimacy.
India has historically championed multilateralism and the UN framework in space. By signing the Accords, it has quietly shifted that position without a public debate.
What India Should Do Next
Signing the Artemis Accords without a domestic legal framework is like signing a trade agreement without having a trade ministry. The principles are in place, but the implementation infrastructure is not.
Three things India urgently needs.
First, Parliament must pass a Space Activities Act, not merely a policy, that gives statutory authority to IN-SPACe, establishes liability norms, and clarifies resource rights for private players. Every other major spacefaring nation did this before signing international frameworks.
Second, India must articulate its official position on space resource utilisation clearly, publicly, and through a legal instrument. Silence is not a position. It is a vulnerability.
Third, India’s private space sector needs legal certainty now. Startups cannot build business models on policy documents alone. The Artemis Accords may open doors but without domestic law, Indian companies cannot walk through them.
Conclusion
India signing the Artemis Accords means India believes in transparent, sustainable space exploration. It means India has chosen its geopolitical alignment in an increasingly divided space order. And it means India’s private space sector now operates under a framework that permits things Indian law has not yet addressed.
What it does not mean is that India has a comprehensive space governance framework. What it does not mean is that ISRO will land astronauts on the Moon alongside NASA. And what it does not mean is that Indian companies can confidently extract lunar resources tomorrow.
The signature was the beginning of a conversation, not the conclusion of one. India must now do the harder work of building the legal architecture that makes that signature meaningful.
Authored by Kunal Peelwan, Advocate & Mediator
[1] Artemis Accords, NASA. Available at: https://www.nasa.gov/artemis-accords/ (Accessed: 25 April 2026).
[2] Robert.wickramatunga (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Moon Agreement. Available at: https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/moon-agreement.html (Accessed: 25 April 2026).